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Abstract  
We introduce seven new versions of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) classical physical secure 
key exchange scheme and a new transient protocol for practically-perfect security. While these practical 
improvements offer progressively enhanced security and/or speed for the non-ideal conditions, the fundamental 
physical laws providing the security remain the same.  
In the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) scheme, Alice and Bob utilize the fact that they exactly know not only their 
own resistor value but also the stochastic time function of their own noise, which they generate before feeding it 
into the loop. By using this extra information, they can reduce the duration of exchanging a single bit and in this 
way they achieve not only higher speed but also an enhanced security because Eve's information will 
significantly be reduced due to smaller statistics. 
In the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) system, Alice and Bob have publicly known identical sets of different 
resistors with a proper, publicly known truth table about the bit-interpretation of their combination. In this new 
situation, for Eve to succeed, it is not enough to find out which end has the higher resistor. Eve must exactly 
identify the actual resistor values at both sides. 
In the "keyed" KLJN (KKLJN) system, by using secure communication with a formerly shared key, Alice and 
Bob share a proper time-dependent truth table for the bit-interpretation of the resistor situation for each secure bit 
exchange step during generating the next key. In this new situation, for Eve to succeed, it is not enough to find 
out the resistor values at the two ends. Eve must also know the former key. 
The remaining four KLJN schemes are the combinations of the above protocols to synergically enhance the 
security properties. These are: the "intelligent-multiple" (iMKLJN), the "intelligent-keyed" (iKKLJN), the 
"keyed-multiple" (KMKLJN) and the "intelligent-keyed-multiple" (iKMKLJN) KLJN key exchange systems. 
Finally, we introduce a new transient-protocol offering practically-perfect security without privacy amplification, 
which is not needed at practical applications but it is shown for the sake of ongoing discussions. 
 
Keywords: information theoretic security; unconditional security; practically perfect security; secure key 
distribution via wire; secure smart power grid. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this section we briefly define our basic terms of secure key exchange utilizing the laws of 
physics and introduce the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange 
protocol. 
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1.1 Conditional, Unconditional, Perfectly and Imperfectly secure key exchange 
 
In private-key based secure communication, the two parties Alice (A) and Bob (B) possess an 
identical secure key, which is not known to the public, and they are utilizing this key in a 
cipher software to encrypt/decrypt the messages they send/receive [1]. Thus, to able to 
communicate, Alice and Bob must first generate and share a secure key, which is typically a 
random bit sequence. The first important problem of secure communication is how to 
generate and share this key in a secure way between Alice and Bob. Note, even if Alice and 
Bob may already have shared a former secret key to communicate securely and they maybe 
able to share a new key via that secure communication, that is not a security-growing method 
because, if the old key is cracked by an eavesdropper (Eve), the new key will also become 
compromised implying that such a simple method cannot be used to share the new key. Of 
course, Alice and Bob may exchange a secure key by personally meeting or using a mail 
courier service however that is neither satisfactory for high speed nor secure enough (against 
spying) if they share many keys for future use. It is the safest to generate the new key "ad-
hoc" when it is needed. Today's internet-based secure communications use software tools to 
generate and share secure keys where the reason why Eve (who is monitoring the channel) 
cannot extract the key is her limited computational power. However, the whole information 
about the secure key is publicly accessible in the during the key exchange [1]. Thus, these 
methods offer only conditional security because, with sufficient computing power (for 
example by having a hypothetical quantum computer or its noise-based-logic version), the 
key would instantaneously be cracked by Eve. Due to the unexpected progression of 
computing technologies, this type of security is not only conditional but also it is not a future-
proof-security [2]: Eve can potentially crack the recorded key exchange and communication 
in the near future even if presently such task looks hopeless.  
Due to these facts, scientists have been exploring various physical phenomena for secure 
key exchange where the laws of physics could offer the security. The goal is to have a key 
exchange where either the exchange cannot be measured/recorded, or when the information 
measured/recorded by Eve is zero; a situation called perfect information theoretic security; or 
this information is practically miniscule, a situation is practically-perfect information 
theoretic security. If the extracted information by Eve is zero or small and, its amount does 
not depend on Eve's accessible resources when she is approaching the limits imposed by the 
laws of physics, the security is called unconditional [2,3]. In practical cases "unconditional" 
and "information theoretic" security are interchangeable terms [1]. Thus the security 
classification can be classified as perfect unconditional (perfect information theoretic), 
imperfect unconditional (imperfect information theoretic) or conditional, where "perfect" with 
practical elements can only be "practically perfect", and only simplified mathematical models 
of system may offer really perfect security at the theoretical level. With other words, perfect 
unconditional security can only be defined at the (simplified) conceptual level in any physical 
system while imperfect unconditional security is the level that any real physical system can 
aim to reach due to the limitations posed by non-ideal elements and situations [2,3]. Perfect 
security is like infinity, it can be approached but never reached. 
 
 
1.2 The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme 
 
The KLJN scheme is a statistical/physical competitor to quantum communicators and its 
security is based on Kirchhoff’s Loop Law and the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. More 
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generally, it is founded on the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which indicates that the 
security of the ideal scheme is as strong as the impossibility to build a perpetual motion 
machine of the second kind. 
Until 2005, it was a commonly accepted that only quantum key distribution (QKD) is able to 
perform information theoretic (unconditional) secure key exchange and that can theoretically 
provide perfect security while practically it is always imperfect. However, in 2005, the 
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange [2-16] scheme was 
introduced [4] and later it was built and its security demonstrated [7]. These ideas have 
inspired new concepts also in computing, particularly noise-based logic and computing [17-
24], where not the security of data but complexity of data processing has been the issue.  
The core KLJN system, without the defense circuitry (current-voltage 
measurement/comparison, filters, etc.) against invasive and non-ideality attacks, is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Outline of the core KLJN system. Parasitic elements leading to non-ideal features and defense circuit 
block (current/voltage monitoring/comparison) against invasive attack are not the topics of this paper thus they 
are not shown/discussed here. The resistors RA and RB  are randomly selected from the RL ,RH{ }  set. 
We first briefly survey the foundations of the ideal KLJN system [2,4,9]. Fig. 1 shows a 
model of the idealized KLJN scheme designed for secure key exchange [4]. At each KLJN-
clock period, which is the duration of a single bit exchange, Alice and Bob connect their 
randomly chosen resistor, RA  and RB , respectively, to the line. These resistors are randomly 
selected from the set RL ,RH{ } , RL ! RH , where the elements represent the low, L (0), and 
high, H (1), bits, respectively. Alice and Bob randomly choose one of the resistors and 
connect it to the wire line. The situations LH and HL represent secure bit exchange [4], 
because Eve cannot distinguish between them through measurements, while LL and HH are 
insecure. The Gaussian voltage noise generators—delivering white noise with publicly agreed 
bandwidth—represent an enhanced thermal (Johnson) noise at a publicly agreed effective 
temperature Teff  (typicallyTeff !109K  [7]) where their noises are statistically independent 
from each other or from the noise during the former KLJN-clock period. According to the 
Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem, the power density spectra Su ,L ( f )  and Su ,H ( f )  of the 
voltages UL ,A(t)  and UL ,B(t)  supplied by the voltage generators in RL  and RH  are given by 
Su ,L ( f ) = 4kTeff RL   and   Su ,H ( f ) = 4kTeff RH ,                                      (1) 
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respectively. 
In the case of secure bit exchange (i.e., the LH or HL situation), the power density spectrum 
S( f )  and the mean-square amplitude Uch2  of the channel voltage Uch (t)  and the same 
measures of the channel current Ich (t)  are given as 
Uch,HL/LH2 = !f Su ,ch,HL/LH ( f ) = 4kTeff
RLRH
RL + RH
 !f  ,             (2) 
and      
Ich,HL/LH2 = !f  Si,ch,HL/LH (t) =
4kTeff
RL + RH
!f  ,       (3) 
respectively, where !f  is the noise-bandwidth; and further details are given elsewhere [4,9]. 
It should be observed that during the LH and HL cases, due to linear superposition, the 
spectrum given by Eq. (2) represents the sum of the spectra at two particular situations, i.e., 
when only the noise generator of   
! 
RL  is running one gets  
SL ,u ,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RL
RH
RL + RH
!
"#
$
%&
2
        ,                         (4) 
and when the noise generator of   
! 
RH  is running one has  
SH ,u ,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RH
RL
RL + RH
!
"#
$
%&
2
 .                                        (5) 
The ultimate security of the system against passive attacks is provided by the fact that the 
power PH!L , by which the noise generator of resistor RH  is heating resistor RL , is equal to 
the power PL!H  by which the noise generator of resistor RL  is heating resistor RH  [4,9]. 
Thus the net power flow between Alice and Bob is zero, which is required by the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics. A proof of this can easily be derived from Eqs. (4,5) for the noise-
bandwidth of !f  :  
PL!H =
SL ,u ,ch ( f )"f
RH
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )2
 ,                                                  (6a) 
and              
PH!L =
SH ,u ,ch ( f )"f
RL
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )2
 .        (6b) 
The equality PH!L = PL!H  (cf. Eq. (6)) is in accordance with the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics; violating this equality would mean not only going against basic laws of 
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physics (the inability to build a perpetual motion machine) but also allowing Eve to use the 
voltage-current cross-correlation Uch (t)  Ich, (t)  to extract the bit [4]. However the only 
quantity that could provide directional information is zero, Uch,HL/LH (t) Ich,HL/LH (t) = 0 , and 
hence Eve has no information to determine the bit location during the LH and HL situations. 
This security proof against passive (listening) attacks holds only for Gaussian noise, which 
has the well-known property that its power density spectrum or autocorrelation function 
already provides the maximum achievable information about the noise, and no higher order 
distribution functions or other tools (such as higher-order statistics) are able to serve with 
additional information. 
The error probability of the bit exchange between Alice and Bob is determined by the 
following issue. In the case of the LL bit status of Alice and Bob, which is not secure 
situation, the channel voltage and current satisfy: 
Uch,LL2 = !f Su ,ch,LL ( f ) = 4kTeff
RL
2  !f    and     Ich,LL
2 = !f  Si,ch,LL (t) =
2kTeff
RL
!f  , (7) 
while, in the case of the other non-secure situation, the HH bit status, the channel voltage and 
current satisfy: 
Uch,HH2 = !f Su ,ch,HH ( f ) = 4kTeff
RH
2  !f     and    Ich,HH
2 = !f  Si,ch,HH (t) =
2kTeff
RH
!f  (8) 
During key exchange in this classical way, Alice and Bob must compare the predictions of 
Eqs. (2,3,7,8) with the actually measured mean-square channel voltage and current to decide 
if the situation is secure (LH or HL) while utilizing the fact that these mean-square values are 
different in each of these three situations (LL, LH/HL and HH). If the situation is secure, 
Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the inverse of his/her bit, which means, a 
secure key exchange takes place. To make an error-free key exchange, Alice and Bob must 
use a sufficiently large statistics, which means long-enough KLJN-clock period. However, the 
length of the KLJN-clock period determines the speed of the exchange of the whole key and, 
most importantly, Eve's statistics when utilizing non-ideal features to extract information. 
Thus protocols that can reduce the necessary duration of the KLJN-clock period for a 
satisfactory statistics (fidelity) for Alice and Bob would enhance not only the speed but also 
the security. The new ("intelligent") KLJN protocol described in Sec. 2 offers this kind of 
improvement. 
 
1.3 On invasive attacks and non-idealities  
 
It should be observed [2,3,4,6,9,10,11,12] that deviations from the shown circuitry—
including invasive attacks by Eve, parasitic elements, delay effects, inaccuracies, non-
Gaussianity of the noise, etc.—will cause a potential information leak toward Eve. The circuit 
symbol “line” in the circuitry represents an ideal wire with uniform instantaneous voltage and 
current along it. Fortunately the KLJN system is very simple, implying that the number of 
such attacks is strongly limited. The defense method against attacks utilizing these aspects is 
straightforward and it is generally based on the comparison of instantaneous voltage and 
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current data at the two ends via an authenticated communication between Alice and Bob.  
These attacks are not subject of the present paper and we refer to our relevant papers where 
they have been analyzed [2,3,4,6,9,10,11,12] and misconceptions (or errors) of other papers 
written by others corrected. In surveys [2,3], existing invasive attacks by other authors and us 
have been surveyed.  
It is important to emphasize that, if the security of a certain bit is compromised, that is known 
also by Alice and Bob therefore they can decide to discard the bit to have a clean secure key. 
The price for that is a reduced speed of key exchange however the perfect` security can be 
maintained. Alternatively privacy amplification can be executed [13], which also results in a 
slower key exchange. In conclusion, in the KLJN system, Alice and Bob can always protect 
themselves against eavesdropping of the key but they are still vulnerable against jamming the 
key exchange by Eve (the same situation exists in QKD, too, because the single photons are 
the most easy objects to jam).  
 
2. The "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
The important characteristics of all passive attack types against practical KLJN systems is that 
Eve’s bit-guessing success rate is strongly limited by poor statistics [4,6,9,10,11,12]. In most 
cases, Eve has a very weak signal-to-noise ratio due to the limited KLJN-clock period, which 
is the time window to make that statistics [11,12]. Thus, if we could further limit Eve’s time 
window her success rate would further decrease. As we have already pointed out above, the 
minimum duration of the clock period in the original KLJN scheme is set by Alice and Bob 
by their need to successfully classify the measured mean-square channel voltage and/or 
current levels by comparing them with the predictions of Eqs. (2,3,7,8) in order to identify 
that to which one of the LL, LH/HL, HH situations does the actual status corresponds [4].  
 
 The Intelligent KLJN (iKLJN) system allows using shorter KLJN-clock period thus it 
further weakens Eve's statistics. It has the same hardware as the original KLJN system but the 
protocol is more calculation-intensive. Alice and Bob utilize the fact that they exactly know 
not only their own resistor value but also the stochastic time function of their own noise, 
which they generate before feeding it into the loop. In the iKLJN method, Alice and Bob, by 
utilizing the superposition theorem on the channel noise, subtract their own contribution to 
generate a reduced-channel-noise that does not contain their own noise component. Because 
they don't know the resistance value at the other end, they must run two alternative 
computational-schemes simultaneously to calculate the reduced-channel-noises to account for 
the possible resistance situations (totally four time functions, two voltage and two current 
noises corresponding to the two possible resistance situations at the other end), see below. 
Then they analyze that at which one of these situations the reduced-channel-noise does not 
contain their noise contribution. The reduced-channel-noise that does not contain their noise 
component has been calculated with the correct assumption about the actual resistance value 
used by the other party. Thus the nature of the decision Alice and Bob makes is changed in 
the iKLJN: instead of evaluating mean-square noise amplitudes, they must assess the 
independence of two noise processes. Note, obviously they continue to assess the channel 
noise situation also in the classical way by evaluating the mean-square of the cannel noise 
amplitudes, which has partially independent information, thus combining the new and old 
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information sources in the guessing process significantly shortens the KLJN-clock period 
needed for a given error probability. 
At the same time, Eve can only use her old way, the parasitic elements to extract any 
information. Because Eve's available observation time window (the KLJN-clock period set by 
Alice and Bob) becomes shorter, the information that she can extract is also significantly 
reduced. She may not even be sure during the shortened KLJN-clock period if a secure bit 
exchange took place, or not, therefore her related error rate will increase. Thus, in the non-
ideal situation, when information-leak exists, the reduced observation time window 
progressively worsens Eve's probability of successfully guessing not only the key bits but also 
guessing which KLJN-clock periods had secure bit exchange. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Snapshot of the current and the voltages in the KLJN system: at a given time moment, the polarities of 
Alice's and Bob's voltages and the resulting current are shown.  
 
2.1 Analysis of the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
To analyze the system with this new approach and to illustrate its way of functioning, first, let 
us assume that Bob's resistance is RB  and Alice's one is: 
RA =!RB            (9) 
where ! " 1 . We analyze Bob's protocol to demonstrate the process. Alice is acting in a 
similar way, which results in the same type of features. 
 
According to Kirchhoff's Loop Law, the channel noise current Ic(t)  and noise voltage Uc(t)  
at a given instant of time are given as: 
Ic =
UB !UA
RB 1+"( )
          (10) 
Uc =
UA +!UB
1+!  
 ,         (11) 
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where, for convenience, we skipped the time variable from the equations. Bob's calculation of 
the reduced-channel-noise currents and voltages is carried out in the following way. 
 
Hypothesis-­‐1:	  Reduced-­‐channel-­‐noise	  with	  the	  incorrect	  assumption	  
 
In one of the computational-schemes, Bob supposes that the resistance value of Alice is the 
same as his one, that is, RA = RB  , which is the incorrect assumption. Then the "incorrect" 
reduced-channel-current and reduced-channel-voltage amplitudes, Ic,1*  and Uc,1*  , are: 
Ic,1* = Ic !
UB
2RB
= UB !UARB 1+"( )
! UB2RB
= ! 1RB
2UA !UB 1!"( )
2 1+"( )     (12) 
Uc,1* =Uc !
UB
2 =
UA +"UB
1+" !
UB
2 =
2UA !UB 1!"( )
2 1+"( )      (13) 
 
Hypothesis-­‐2:	  Reduced-­‐channel-­‐noise	  with	  the	  correct	  assumption	  
 
In the other computational-scheme, Bob supposes that the resistance value of Alice is 
different than his one, that is, RA =!RB  , which is the correct assumption. Then the "correct" 
reduced-channel-current and reduced-channel-voltage amplitudes, Ic,2*  and Uc,2*  , are: 
Ic,2* = Ic !
UB
RB 1+"( )
= UB !UARB 1+"( )
! UBRB 1+"( )
= !UARB 1+"( )
     (14) 
Uc,2* =Uc !
"UB
1+" =
UA +"UB
1+" !
"UB
" +1 =
UA
1+"       (15) 
It is obvious from our approach and the results in Eqs (12-15) that, in the case of the incorrect 
assumption, the reduced-channel-noises contain both the noise contribution of Alice (UA(t) ) 
and that of Bob (UB(t) ) while, in the case of the incorrect assumption, they contain the noise 
of Alice (UA(t) ) only. Thus, Bob, by using a proper statistical tool to compare the reduced-
channel-noises with his own noise (UB(t) ) and checking for the independence, he can identify 
the "correct" assumption and, in this way, learn the actual resistor value of Alice. One of the 
simplest ways of that is the evaluation of the cross-correlations between his noises and the 
reduced-channel-noises: 
 
With the incorrect assumption: 
UBIc,1* =
UB2 1!"( )
2 1+"( )RB
# 0          (16) 
UBUc,1* =
UB2 ! "1( )
2 1+!( ) # 0          (17) 
With the correct assumption: 
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UBIc,2* =
! UAUB
RB 1+"( )
= 0
         
(18) 
UBUc,2* =
UAUB
1+! = 0          (19) 
While evaluating and comparing these cross-correlations is a new and independent source of 
information for Bob about Alice's resistance; in the field of statistics, there are more efficient 
ways of estimations, which will be explored in the future.  
Naturally, Alice is proceeding in the same way as Bob. Then combining this "intelligent" 
method with the original assessments based on the voltage and current noises will 
significantly enhance the information of Alice and Bob, and thus they can use shorter KLJN-
clock period to reach the same error probability as earlier. And, because Eve does not have 
access to the "intelligent" way of information extraction, her successful guessing probability 
of the resistor situation in the non-ideal KLJN system will drop significantly compared to the 
original KLJn situation, while in the ideal system her information remains zero. Moreover, 
due to the reduction of KLJN-clock duration, also Eve's error probability of guessing if a 
secure bit exchange took place or not will decrease, which further enhances her uncertainty. 
 
Finally, an important question: What is the price of this "intelligent" enhancement of the 
original KLJN protocol? A higher computational capacity is needed for Alice and Bob to 
carry out this task, which implies higher electrical power requirements, too. Thus, when 
computational performance is limited or low power requirements are essential, the classical 
KLJN protocol (and its "multiple" and/or "keyed" versions, see below) is the way to go. 
 
 
3. An educational problem about the KLJN system 
 
This section is not essential for the rest of the paper thus Readers who are not interested in the 
deeper understanding of the foundations of the KLJN system can jump to the next section. A 
natural question arises about the iKLJN theory: Do we need statistical evaluation or perhaps 
we could quickly determine the correct assumption by just using the reduced voltage and 
current values? Similar questions arose in 2005 before Johnson (-like) noise was introduced 
into the KLJN system and a random DC voltage generator pair version of it was explored. 
The answer was that Johnson noise and statistical analysis were needed. That study was 
unpublished and, we will now show that the similar situation in the iKLJN system leads to the 
same conclusion; statistics cannot be avoided. 
If we use Ohm's law between the correctly deduced reduced-channel-voltage and reduced-
channel-current components, we get
 Uc,1*
Ic,1*
= ! 1RB
  ,           (20) 
which is the expected result where the negative sign is due to the direction of current 
component into Bobs resistor from Alice's voltage generator, see Fig 2. 
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Our naive expectation may be that, if we do the same derivation with the incorrectly deduced 
current and voltage components then the result will be different and then Bob can 
instantaneously find out that Hypothesis-2 is the valid assumption for Alice's resistor. 
Unfortunately, even the incorrect assumption yields the same result:  
Uc,2*
Ic,2*
= ! 1RB
           (21) 
This surprising result is due to the degeneracy of the system of equations describing the 
channel voltage and current, which also prohibits for Bob to deduce Alice's resistor even 
though he knows his resistor and voltage (a situation that led the author in 2005 to test 
thermal noise in this system). No "instantaneous" way to find out Alice's resistance, that is the 
value of ! , exists due to this degeneracy. In conclusion, only statistical methods can provide 
the necessary information for Bob and Alice.  
 
 
4. The "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
 In the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) system, Alice and Bob have publicly known identical 
sets of different resistors R1 < R2 < ...< Rn{ } . For each KLJN-clock period, they randomly 
choose a resistor from this set and connect it (with a corresponding independent noise 
generator) to the line. There is a publicly known truth table about the bit-interpretation of the 
different combinations of the chosen Ri ,Rj!" #$  resistor pair, whenever Ri ! Rj , with the 
condition that the bit interpretation of Ri ,Rj!" #$  is the inverse of the bit interpretation of 
Rj ,Ri!" #$ . It is designed so that, when the estimation of one of the resistors is missed at one of 
the sides and the neighboring resistor value is estimated instead, the bit-interpretation reverses 
in order to make Eve's guessing statistics worse.  
 
In this new situation, for Eve to succeed, it is not enough to find out which end has the higher 
resistance. Eve must exactly identify the actual resistor values at both sides (while Alice and 
Bob only at the other side) to know that which Ri ,Rj!" #$ / Rj ,Ri!" #$  situation is the relevant in 
the truth table and, in accordance with the original KLJN principle, even then Eve is unable to 
decide if Ri ,Rj!" #$  or Rj ,Ri!" #$  is the case. The result of modification is again an enhanced 
security in the non-ideal case. 
 
 
5. The "keyed" KLJN (KKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
This enhancement is inspired by Horace Yuen's "keyed" quantum key exchange (called KCQ) 
[25] to enhance the security of his new quantum key exchange protocol. It works after a 
secure key is already generated/shared by Alice and Bob in the KLJN protocol. Then, by 
using secure communication with the shared key, they share a time-dependent truth table for 
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the bit-interpretation of the RL ,RH[ ]i  versus RH ,RL[ ]i  resistor situation at the i-th secure bit 
exchange step during generating the next key. Note, the RL ,RH[ ]i  and RH ,RL[ ]i  situations 
must always mean opposite bit values. 
 It is obvious that KKLJN is a security growing technique because, even if Eve would 
succeed with correctly guessing the former key and learn the truth table, the security of the 
new key is still information theoretical (unconditional) and it only "falls back" to the security 
level of the original KLJN key exchange. In the non-ideal case, if Eve has no information 
about the former key, the information of Eve about the key is progressively less than at the 
standard KLJN and in the ideal case her information remains zero. 
 
 
6. The "keyed-multiple" KLJN (KMKLJN) key exchange protocol 
 
Naturally, the KKLJN protocol can be enriched by using multiple resistor sets, n > 2 , in the 
same fashion as the MKLJN system is doing but, instead of a publicly known truth table the 
bit-interpretation of the RL ,RH[ ]i  versus RH ,RL[ ]i  resistor situations is randomly changed for 
the subsequent key exchanges and the relevant truth table is shared by secure communication 
utilizing the former key. The KMKLJN protocol synergically combines the security 
enhancement of the MKLJN and KKLJN protocols. 
 
 
7. Three more protocols:  iMKLJN, iKKLJN and iKMKLJN 
 
The "multiple", "keyed" and "keyed-multiple" KLJN protocols can be combined with the 
"intelligent" method of accessing the resistors at the other end by Alice and Bob to reduce the 
KLJN-clock duration and Eve's information, and to increase the speed. This enrichment 
should always be made whenever calculation power is enough. These are: the "intelligent-
multiple" (iMKLJN), the "intelligent-keyed" (iKKLJN), the "keyed-multiple" (KMKLJN) and 
the "intelligent-keyed-multiple" (iKMKLJN) KLJN key exchange systems.  
 
8. Transient-protocol for practically-perfect security 
Finally, we introduce a new transient-protocol offering practically-perfect security without 
privacy amplification, which is not needed at practical applications but shown for the sake of 
ongoing discussions. At the beginning of each bit-exchange period (KLJN-clock period), until 
the thermalization, which is the mixing and equilibration of noise-propagation (not waves) in 
the cable takes place, there is a potential for information leak. Even though, so far, no 
concrete method has been show that would be able to extract the key bit, precautions have 
been made to reduce this effect by low-pass line-filters (which always must be present to keep 
away wave-generating frequency components of the wave-limit, and to prevent hacking 
attacks), ramping-up the generator voltages or, instead of ramping starting the generators from 
zero voltage. However, even in these cases, one can expect some small information leak at the 
beginning because the system starts with noises that have not been mixed. This information 
leak is supposed to be very small with these stochastic signals (still needs a concrete attack to 
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see how much it is) because of the relaxation time constant of the low-pass filters is much 
longer than the propagation time in the cable (this is required by the no-wave limit). Thus, we 
show the "ultimate transient protocol" below for the sake of discussions not for practical 
applications. 
 
The protocol is as follows. First Alice and Bob randomly decide if they want to use RL  or RH  
during the next KLJN-clock period for their RA  and RB , respectively. Then, to execute the 
key exchange, they use continuously variable resistors (such as potentiometers, etc.). If noise 
generators also used to enhance the noise-temperature than the band-limited white noise 
spectra of the noise-generators are also variable in a synchronized fashion so that the noise-
temperature stays constant, at the publicly agreed value Teff . At the beginning of the KLJN-
clock period, both Alice and Bob start with: 
 
RA(0) = RB(0) =
RL + RH
2                                                                                                       (22) 
 
and they stay at this value until the noises equilibrate in the wire. Thus no informative 
transients can be observed after connecting the resistors to the line. Then Alice and Bob 
execute independent slow continuous-time random-walks with their resistor values (and in a 
in a synchronized fashion with the spectral parameter of their noise generators). The random 
walks are executed so slowly that, from a thermodynamic point of view, the system is 
changing in the adiabatic limit: there is virtually a thermal equilibrium in the line during the 
whole random-walk process.  
There is a publicly pre-agreed time period tr to execute these independent random walks. If 
within this time period Alice and Bob reach their randomly preselected RA  and RB  value, 
they stop the random walk and stay at this value. Then, after the tr time period, they start the 
KLJN protocol, in the regular way or a proper advanced fashion described in this paper. In 
this way, the transient effects and the information leak they may cause, are virtually kept 
away. 
If by the end of the tr time period, either the random-walk of Alice or Bob (or both) does not 
reach the randomly preselected resistance value, he/she (or both) submits a cancellation signal 
via an authenticated channel and the bit exchange process is terminated and a new KLJN-
clock period starts in the way described above. 
Note, it is also possible to introduce alternative protocols where there is no preliminary 
random decision by Alice and Bob and they use the random value they get by the random 
walk at the end of the tr time period. If the difference of obtained resistance values is large 
enough they can use it for secure key exchange. The fact if the difference is large enough will 
turn out only at the end f the KLJN-clock period and then they can decide (based on publicly 
known rules) if they keep the exchanged bit. 
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9. Summary  
 
While the KLJN secure key exchange has perfect security at the idealized (mathematical) 
conditions, in the case of non-ideal devices (including non-zero range with finite speed), there 
is some information leak, similarly to quantum key exchange. To reach practically-perfect 
security, Alice and Bob can do privacy amplification [13] or discarding the bits [9] that 
provide information to Eve beyond a certain threshold. In this paper, we show additional ways 
to enhance the security in the non-ideal cases by using one of the seven new extended 
protocols introduced above.  
 
In Table 1, we summarize the hardware and computational requirements of the various 
protocols.  
 
 KLJN iKLJN MKLJN KKLJN KMKLJN iMKLJN iKKLJN iKMKLJN 
Number n 
of resistors 2 2 n > 2 2 n > 2 n > 2 2 n > 2 
Loops to 
compute - 2 - - - n(n-1) 2 n(n-1) 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the standard KLJN hardware requirements with that of the improved versions. 
 
It should be noted that the foundations of the security remain the same: the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, the particular properties of Gaussian stochastic processes, and Kirchhoff's 
Law. 
 
Finally, we should emphasize that, due to the exchange and comparison of the current/voltage 
data at the two ends of the line, Alice and Bob exactly know Eve's information [9]. This is a 
new and unique situation in physical secure key exchange systems because QKD does not 
have this advantage. Though the exact implications of this fact must yet to be explored, it is 
obvious that it can offer formerly unexpected ways for enhancing security by properly 
discarding risky bits. 
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